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           When thinking about violence, death, loss, and grief in the world through the lens of 
International Relations, it is necessary to question and challenge the mainstream modes of 
relating with others. It is imperative to rethink why certain bodies matter and others do not; why 
some ways of thinking are obvious and others become peripheral; why some deaths count and 
others are not counted. If the world(s) in which we inhabit has become one where ‘out of sight, 
out of mind’ dominates, what might this mean for those whose bodies, voices, experiences, and 
lives have become invisible? In an attempt to move toward an ethical and thoughtful 
reconsidering, I wish to say that there are, however, those of us who do mind this selective 
political violence.  
           It is necessary to engage with the political and philosophical implications that are implicit 
in this type of killing in the world when thinking about drone violence. Through this exploration 
of the discourse and politics surrounding drone strikes, I am attempting to disrupt the mainstream 
language surrounding drone violence. The emergence of highly technological and mechanized 
weaponry has aided the ‘modern state’s’ project of killing. This detached, dehumanized, and 
remote form of violence is reflected in the international response, selective presence in the 
western news and media, and the language used by those who defend (as well as those who 
criticize) drone strikes. In this paper, I will disturb the normalization of this type of violence and 
this way of thinking of others in the ‘international sphere.’ Throughout my thesis, rather than 
perpetuating the distant, detached, and impersonal nature of the discourse surrounding drone 
violence, I wish to offer a more thoughtful and intimate engagement with this form of killing in 











           When considering the responses to this type of violence, the image of Omran Daqneesh 
comes to mind. Omran, a five year-old boy from Syria, has gained international attention after a 
Russian airstrike in Aleppo destroyed his building in 2016. This photo and the video of Omran’s 
tiny, dust-encrusted body sitting on a (far too big) orange ambulance chair, with his small legs 
dangling over the edge, caught the interest of thousands of people, “jarring even a public numbed 
to disaster.”1 After seeing this image, it made me wonder what it was about this photo that 
brought me to tears. Why did my heart catch for Omran? Perhaps it was his disheveled haircut or 
his half-bloodied face. Or maybe it was his big, wandering, saucer eyes, which searched 
desperately for something familiar to fix onto. There was something about this image that spoke 
directly to that part of one’s soul that could feel the pain of another person. Omran’s eyes 
pleaded with us, staring directly into our deepest parts. What is it about this photo that made 
Omran a symbol for Syria’s suffering? Did he ask for this? Does he know what effect his misery 
has on those across the world, who are now paying attention? Does he know that he was 
circulating social media and international news, appealing to a collective care for about a month? 
           In the response from the mainstream news and media, Omran has become a ‘symbol’ for 
the suffering in Syria and for children who have become victims of violence in war. The outrage, 
empathy, and compassion that have been performed by those who have encountered this 
photograph are apparent. Later in this thesis, I will explore the ways in which Omran has become 
																																																								
1 Barnard, Anne. “How Omran Daqneesh, 5, Became a Symbol of Aleppo’s Suffering.” The New York Times, 18 
August, 2016, pp. A1.  
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a ‘perfect victim’ through the documentation of photography, locating him as a silent ‘object-
victim.’ I will also return to the problematics of empathy in this response. This position in which 
Omran finds himself, serves to feed into neocolonial rescue narratives and to perpetuate the 
location of the West as the savior figure.2 I will return to this photo later in this piece and will 





I stand between my shame and relief 
I breathe... 
The missiles missed this time 
Truth is, they didn’t really miss 
 
Someone’s house is destroyed 
but not the house I know so well 
Someone’s family is grieving  
but not the one whose name I carry 
I linger... 
Between my shame and relief 
I breathe... 
I... breathe... 
I tell myself 
‘this flesh, torn and scattered, 
is not flesh I have ever embraced.’ 
I soothe myself, 
‘Nor are these small lifeless hands 
the ones with I crayon I’ve traced.’  
I... breathe... 
This time... the missiles missed 
those whose names are engraved on my lips  
																																																								
2 Katz, Andrew. “The Night Omran Was Saved.” Time, 26 August 2016. 
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This time 
they didn’t stop 




And when it’s over 
And while a less fortunate family weeps 
I stand between shame and relief 
I breathe... 
I breathe... 
Thank God my loved ones were spared 
This time.”3 
~~~ 
           As Achille Mbembe argues in his essay entitled Necropolitics,4 biopower emerges in 
sovereign states through the power to determine who should live and who must die. Mbembe 
uses Foucault’s concepts of the state of exception and emergency as the basis upon which to 
distinguish the right to kill. For those who live at the other end of drone violence, the state of 
exception has become normalized and has perpetuated the violence of humans as objects. 
Mbembe also argues that “the perception of the existence of the Other as an attempt on my life, 
as a mortal threat or absolute danger whose biophysical elimination would strengthen my 
potential to life and security” is characteristic of modernity itself (Mbembe 18). This is 
facilitated by the hyper-mechanized weaponry of airstrikes. The location of the enemy elsewhere 
(even as an Other within the Self) has become an element particular to the sovereignty of the 
modern West5. In other words, “sovereignty means the capacity to define who matters and who 
																																																								
3 Sabawi, Samah. “A Confession.” With Our Eyes Wide Open: Poems of the New American Century, edited by 
Douglas Valentine, West End Press, 2014, pp. 42.  
4 Mbembe, Achille. “Necropolitics.” Public Culture, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2003, pp. 11-40.  
5 Throughout this thesis, when referring to the ‘modern West,’ I choose to define it as the secular, capitalist, liberal, 
progressive, hegemonic, rational, sovereign, objective, patriarchal, militaristic, strategic, and at times colonialist 
nature of the United States and those who locate themselves within this ‘modern West.’ I realize that there may be 
multiple Wests and multiple modernities and that the various and plural ways of being in the world (which may not 
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does not, who is disposable and who is not” (Mbembe 27). This conceptualization of 
sovereignty, modern state power, and biopolitics is reflected in the violence of the drone, as the 
modern, western hegemonies that deploy airstrikes are in control of determining which bodies 
are ‘collateral’ and which are not. These concepts and theories are useful in tracing a genealogy 
of the deployment and the politics of drone violence.  
           In my first part, I will explore the ways in which violence and empathy are interrelated. I 
will look into the reasons why certain images enter into the modern, western political 
consciousness and a particular type of empathy, while others may not. Here, I will return to the 
image of Omran Daqneesh. I am also interested in the reasons for which this particular image 
gained so much attention in the media and in the news, while other victims of drone strikes 
remain invisible to the modern, western imaginary. I will trace the way in which this shocking 
image enters into this political imaginary and will question why other images might not. 
However, I will also attempt to engage with a deeper critique of a participation in a politics of 
empathy. In addressing the appeals, as well as the limitations and shortcomings of this type of 
empathy, I will also call forth possibilities for different types of compassion, which may not be 
located within the modern West. In departing from the form of empathy of the European 
Enlightenment and moving toward other ways of thinking about compassion and relating with 
others, I wish to offer an entry point into another mode of thinking about empathy, which may be 
useful in an engagement with violence in the international realm.  
           In the second part of this thesis, I will engage with the various politics of language that are 
invoked in the discourse of those who defend drone strikes as well as those who criticize them. 
In this section, I am hoping to challenge the ways in which the supposed ‘precision,’ ‘efficiency,’ 
and ‘accuracy’ of drone violence are reflected in the abstract, remote, detached, and distant form 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
adhere to these categories of ‘modern’ or ‘western’) within the geographic West may depart from these aspects of 
what I define as the ‘modern West.’ In this way, I define the ‘modern West’ more in terms of a theoretical and 
conceptual space, which cohabitates with other ways of living and thinking about the world. I believe these 
particularities of the ‘modern West’ become necessary in the deployment of drone strikes and a certain way of 
relating with others.	
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of language spoken by “defense intellectuals.”6 This type of language treats certain lives as 
peripheral or collateral, which normalizes the violence and renders the destruction of these lives 
as thinkable, due to the economistic language of humans-as-numbers. This ‘sanitized’ language, 
which neglects possibilities of invoking the humanness of victims, survivors, family members, 
and loved ones of those at the other end of drone violence, mirrors the fictitious notion of drones 
as precise and efficient weapons that reduce loss of life. However, in addition to criticisms of the 
language used by drone strike defenders, I am also interested in rethinking the terminologies and 
lacking languages used by certain humanitarian organizations and those who condemn these 
drone strikes. In this section, I engage with questions of the ways in which moral objections to 
drone violence become conflated with concerns related to its legality. I am also interested in the 
ways in which certain lives are reduced to numbers, even within reports that appear to mourn the 
loss of these lives. In this section, I re-conceptualize the modes of thinking about drone violence 
and the often times problematic language used in various contexts.  
           After tracing the ways in which language reflects certain types of this violence, in my 
third part, I will attempt to complicate the so-called modern, western political imaginary, using 
Judith Butler’s concepts of “First Worldism” and vulnerability (Butler 8).7 I challenge the notion 
that drones are somehow morally superior in their killing than other types of violence. I will look 
into other forms of violence here, such as suicide bombings, which are viewed as ‘horrific,’ 
‘barbaric,’ and showing no regard for human life. By using this comparison, the concept of drone 
violence as ‘clean’ or ‘sanitized’ killing will be questioned. Here, I will look into the ways in 
which suicide bombings are seen in the modern West in such a horrific way. In contrasting 
seemingly opposite forms of violence (one extremely distant and detached, and the other 
extremely intimate), I wish to contest the support for one and the negation of the other. In this 
																																																								
6 Cohn, Carol. “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.” Signs, Vol. 12, No. 4, Within and 
Without: Women, Gender, and Theory. 1987, pp. 687-718. 
7 Butler, Judith. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. Verso, 2004. 
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way, I will consider the figure of the suicide bomber and will rethink the ways in which they 
are viewed in the modern West. I will also reconsider the ways in which female suicide bombers 
are spoken of, especially within western, white feminism. The way of thinking that the West 
perpetuates by locating suicide bombings in its own past reflects the idea of the modern, 
progressive, linear timeline that western hegemony inflicts upon the subaltern. This way of 
thinking should be challenged and rethought.  
           In the fourth part of this thesis (and throughout), I will use interviews, poetry, music, and 
art created by those who live at the other end of drone violence. Through these forms, I will 
attempt to center this section and my thesis on the ways in which drone violence has pervaded 
the everyday lives of these ordinary people. Rather than perpetuating the violent and economistic 
reduction of humans to numbers, these artistic and poetic expressions will not only center the 
voices of those at the other end of drone violence, but will also contribute to the treatment of 
these people as full humans. Before engaging with the poetic and artistic forms of resistance, I 
will use interviews and testimonials from people who have been affected by a U.S. drone strike 
on March 17, 2011 on a community meeting in North Waziristan, Pakistan. Through these first 
hand accounts and stories, I will complicate the supposed isolated singularity of these atrocity 
events by expanding the violence temporally, to demonstrate its pervasiveness into the 
beforehand, during, and aftermath of airstrikes. The nature of this highly technologized and 
mechanized form of killing haunts those at the other end after its destruction and before it is 
deployed. Through this rethinking of the distinctiveness of drone strikes, the permeation of 
drones into the everyday lives of ordinary people is emphasized. Along these lines, I will use the 
poetry, art, and music that those at the other end of drone violence create, in order to show the 
ways in which this form of violence pervades into so many parts of their lives. In looking at 
these types of expression, I will disrupt the data-centered, empirical, economistic way of thinking 
about humans-as-numbers, and instead will try to think of this type of evidence as an expression 
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of the human that may not be completely ‘rational,’ yet is tremendously meaningful. I wish to 
complicate the type of ‘rationality’ that hard-nosed, strategy-centered drone strike defenders 
claim to embody, by exposing their irrationality and questioning whether this rationality should 
have a place in a thoughtful and ethical engagement with international relations and the world. I 
choose to invoke these artistic forms through interruptions throughout my thesis in addition to 
centering the last section around them. This last section will act as a culmination of the 
assemblages of elements surrounding drone strikes, outlined throughout the other parts of my 



















Part I: Navigating Empathy and Violence in International Relations 
The Role of ‘Shock-Pictures’ and Images of Object-Victims: 
           In the international response to drone strikes, it is interesting to consider what draws 
people in. What is it that makes a person feel empathy for something that has been done to 
another human being? Why do certain images of pain and suffering speak to one’s emotions and 
invoke a reaction, while others may not? What purpose do these images serve? In thinking about 
the media’s response to certain remote-controlled violences, I return to the image of Omran. It is 
necessary to wonder what type of empathy this image elicits and what the function of this 
compassion means for those at the other end of violence. The impact and role that ‘shock 
images’ such as Omran’s have in the world is unquestionable. For the viewer, it serves the 
purpose of invoking a certain type of care and empathy. What does this empathy mean in 
international relations? When is it invoked and when does it expire, leaving our consciousness 
with dust in its wake? As images such as Omran’s serve to disturb the faceless violence that 
airstrikes claim to deploy, they also play an important role in humanitarian responses to certain 
types of violence. Those who justify drone strikes claim that this type of violence is detached, 
removed, and clean, using sanitized language (as I will discuss in Part II). Their discourse 
professes a justification for this distant form of violence by stating its precision and goal of 
targeting ‘suspicious activities,’ whose actions validate ‘collateral damage.’ However, as the 
spectator has identified in Omran’s image, this collateral damage seems to have a face.  
            In the abstraction of Omran as a symbol of all of Syria’s suffering, and of the pain of 
drone strike victims, it is important to think about which images are shown to the modern West 
and which are rendered invisible. It is essential to return to the question of what it is about the 
figure of Omran that summons such a strong international humanitarian response. Here, it is 
necessary to think of the role that an understood innocence plays in an invocation of empathy. As 
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Miriam Ticktin describes in her essay, The Problem with Humanitarian Borders,8 
humanitarianism relies on the figure of the perfect victim as its reference point in establishing 
categories and degrees of innocence. “Humanitarianism sets up a distinction between innocent 
and guilty, leaving no space for the experiences of life. The quintessential humanitarian victims 
bear no responsibility for their suffering. Their innocence is what qualifies them for humanitarian 
compassion. As innocents, they are pure, without guile, and without intent – they are seemingly 
outside politics...” (Ticktin)9. It is interesting to think about what a humanitarianism that relies on 
innocence and vulnerability might mean for international politics.  
           As Ticktin notes, the figure of the perfect victim and those who are viewed as ‘innocent’ 
rely on a binary of opposites, invoking the other figure of the non-innocent, or the guilty. In the 
case of drone strikes, those who are seen as guilty, or at least deserving of violence, are neglected 
and made invisible. It is interesting to wonder which violences have a face and which are 
rendered faceless. Because Omran is a child, he is immediately and automatically viewed as an 
innocent victim. However, at what point will he outgrow this innocence? When does it expire? In 
general, children are the embodiment of the perfect victim. However, what is it that makes us 
unable to see the same innocence that we see in Omran, in other victims of drone strikes? Why 
are young adult men in North Waziristan, Pakistan, labeled “combatants,” if they are of a 
particular age, and are seen as guilty until proven innocent (“posthumously”) after violence has 
already been done?10 What is it that limits our empathy in this way, prohibiting our compassion 
and care from being applied and extended to these young men? Why is their pain and suffering 
erased?  
           It is interesting to think about the function of Omran’s innocence within humanitarianism. 
The care, compassion, and empathy activated by humanitarianism are rendered outside of the 
																																																								
8 Ticktin, Miriam. “The Problem With Humanitarian Borders.” Public Seminar, 18 September, 2015.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Becker, Jo and Scott Shane. “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will.” The New York 
Times, 29 May 2012, pp. A1.   
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realm of politics, as they are located within spaces of emergency. This type of care is fleeting 
and only relies on a call to action that would actually perpetuate the violent structures already in 
place in the geopolitical sphere. By depoliticizing the innocent, perfect victim, the humanitarian 
industrial complex maintains its position of offering a limited care and empathy only within 
certain conditions and specific circumstances. The restriction of care, only applied and deployed 
within certain constraints, contributes to a critique of humanitarianism.  
           One of these conditions relies on the act of locating the oppression and violence in a 
temporal or spatial elsewhere. In this case, Omran was a victim of a Russian airstrike. In this 
way, because the violence was done by a country other than the United States, it allows the U.S., 
as well as humanitarian organizations within the U.S., to freely condemn this violent action. 
Locating oppression elsewhere is a key component of the foreign policies of the United States, as 
I will describe in Part III. Positing the blame on powers other than the U.S. makes it easier for 
those who condemn violence to feel less complicit. ‘Shock pictures,’ such as Omran’s, have a 
function of creating feelings of empathy and compassion amongst those who view them. 
However, it is worth questioning the implications of a politics of care, compassion, and empathy.  
           As Susan Sontag describes in her book, Regarding the Pain of Others,11 images and 
specifically “shock-pictures” of mangled bodies and victims serve the purpose of making the 
unreal more real (Sontag 9). She explains how “Walter Lippman wrote in 1922: ‘Photographs 
have the kind of authority over imagination today, which the printed word had yesterday, and the 
spoken word before that. They seem utterly real’” (Sontag 22). Photography plays the role of 
documenting atrocities and rendering violence visible to the imaginations of those who are “only 
nominally concerned about some nasty war taking place in another country. The photographs are 
a means of making ‘real’ (or ‘more real’) matters that the privileged and the merely safe might 
prefer to ignore” (Sontag 9). If this is the case, then it is imperative to think about why it is that 
																																																								
11 Sontag, Susan. Regarding the Pain of Others. London: Penguin, 2004. Print.  
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seeing is believing. Why are we unable to feel compassion unless we see it for our own eyes? 
What does this say about the need for evidential documentation when responding to international 
violence? Why are images necessary in the invocation of empathy?  
           However, even if we were to extend our empathies further than their current limitations 
allow in our world(s) so that it is more inclusive, what might this mean for our political 
engagement? What would a politics of empathy mean for us? It is interesting to ponder whether 
or not it is something that we truly wish to strive for when responding to violence in the world. 
Empathy is undoubtedly problematic due to its inherent limitations. When we empathize, it is 
usually short-lived, easily forgotten, and skewed toward those who are obviously ‘innocent.’ It is 
also usually self-referential, spoken in the language of ‘he could have been my son or brother’ or 
‘what if this had happened to me or one of my loved ones?’ Why must empathy always evoke 
the Self? Perhaps this speaks to the self-interested nature of the way in which we relate to other 
humans in the modern West. This type of politics, a politics of empathy, has serious 
shortcomings. Perhaps empathy may not actually be what we are aiming for in an ethical and 
thoughtful engagement with violence in international relations.  
           Although the care, compassion, and empathy invoked in the international response to 
Omran’s photograph is a welcome change from the dominant self-interested audience in the 
modern West, it is necessary to question what role these images, and the feelings that arise from 
them, play. Why must these people only have a presence in the international realm as victims and 
objects, understood to be asking for help, care, and compassion? Why do these bodies “appear 
only as object-victims to be saved but not as speaking subjects? Why do they only confirm, 
affirm the international but never speak to it?” (Kumarakulasingam 63).12 In other words, why is 
it that certain bodies are only legible to modern, western humanitarianism as victims, not as full 
humans? What does this mean for our conception of the international and the violence and pain 
																																																								
12 Kumarakulasingam, Narendran. “Bloody Translations: The Politics of International Compassion and Horror” 
Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 1. (1), 2014, pp. 61-75. 
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that is suffered through it? How might we think about an alternative way of relating with other 
humans and other bodies without perpetuating the violent structures and systems already in place 
within western humanitarianism? Perhaps the first step in imagining an alternative political way 
of thinking might be to recognize the ways in which shock pictures and the objectification and 
reduction of certain bodies into something other than humans, function in our world.  
 
Alternative Imaginations of Empathy: 
           What ways of thinking about the world would allow for those who live at the other end of 
drone violence, who are not recognized in the dominant international sphere as the perfect 
victim, to be seen as fully human? What new international order would need to be in place for 
Omran’s innocence to be extended, for the object-victim to have a voice, rather than just a body, 
and for a politics of thoughtful selflessness to take the forefront, rather than self-centered 
sympathy? Could this alternative politics ever be thinkable? Before imagining a new world 
order, it is necessary to work through various ways of thinking about the human that exist in the 
here and now, but have perhaps been relegated to the periphery. It may be impossible to imagine 
a utopian future due to the power dynamics inherent in the geopolitical sphere. As soon as one 
system of oppression is dispelled, it is immediately replaced by another violent form. Perhaps it 
is a failure of imagination that limits these dreams of a better future. However, it is important to 
rethink the urge to do so. It is necessary to question the forms of empathy, compassion, 
sympathy, and care that are deployed through humanitarianism and human rights projects; as 
these forms are products of the ‘universal’ Reason that is rooted in European Enlightenment 
thought. In this way, a more complex understanding of the various modes of thinking about the 
human and how people relate to one another may be useful.  
           It is necessary to invoke issues of power, colonialism, marginalization, and oppression 
that are central to thinking about different ways of defining and relating to the concept of 
empathy. “When empathy is understood as the experience of ‘co-feeling’, it is suggested, this not 
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only invites problematic appropriations or projections on the part of ‘privileged’ subjects, it 
also risks obscuring their complicity in wider relations of power in which marginalisation, 
oppression and suffering occur” (Pedwell 6)13. In this postcolonial rethinking of the concept of 
empathy, Pedwell questions the modern European notion of co-feeling. In her brilliant 
exploration of the politics of memory and memorials, Katherine Hite mentions a certain way of 
thinking about empathy. “Pity, the ‘feeling sorry for’ that characterizes sympathy, may foreclose 
our reach toward empathy, the more profound ‘feeling with’ another’s pain” (Hite 57)14. 
However, perhaps it is not enough to only question conceptions of pity and sympathy, 
advocating for an engagement with empathy, or ‘feeling with,’ because even that is entrenched in 
power dynamics, colonial histories, and feigned care. In reality, “there exist many varied and 
overlapping cultural paradigms of emotion – from the ancient Sanskrit topologies of ‘Rasa and 
Bhava’ to Indigenous Canadian theories of ecological affects” (Pedwell 6). Pedwell goes on to 
explore other ways of thinking about emotion and affect in the world, which diverge from 
European empathy, and open up entry points into alternative modes of thinking about affect and 
its movement throughout the geopolitical sphere. 
           In thinking about empathy and its various iterations throughout non-dominant, subaltern 
forms of thought, it is necessary to negate the location of this type of thinking or conceptualizing 
in the temporal past. Rather than speaking of “Sanskrit topologies of ‘Rasa and Bhava’” as 
“ancient,” as Pedwell does, it is important to instead view these modes of thinking as useful ways 
of relating with empathy without perpetuating the destructive, colonial, and simplistic 
relationship with forms of knowledge. This location of certain ways of knowing and being in the 
world as temporally prior is destructive and violent. However, it is important to acknowledge and 
think about other relationships with concepts such as empathy, compassion, sympathy, and care 
																																																								
13 Pedwell, Carolyn. “Decolonising Empathy: Thinking Affect Transnationally,” Samyukta: A Journal of Women’s 
Studies, Special Issue, ‘Decolonizing Theories of the Emotions’. Vol. XVI (1) (Jan 2016): 27-49. 
14 Hite, Katherine. Politics and the Art of Commemoration: Memorials to struggle in Latin America and Spain. 
Routledge, 2012.		
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that may not subscribe to the modern, western form of thought, as the modes of knowledge 
from Adam Smith and David Hume are embedded in power dynamics and colonial histories. 
           In order to challenge the forms of empathy that have been deemed ‘universal’ within the 
modern, western political thought, it is necessary to question how and why this form of thinking 
has become so universal and seemingly obvious. “The human rights/humanitarian project’s 
universalizability is predicated upon it being based on reason. In the age of reason, every 
individual has certain inalienable rights. This truth is universal and hence has to be and can be 
universalized. Yet the humanitarian turn to affect suggests that reason is not, or cannot be, 
devoid of affect. Isn’t this why care, compassion, guilt, and apathy are at the forefront of 
advocacy rather than complexity and context?” (Kumarakulasingam 65-66)15. It is characteristic 
of the reasonable western figure to universalize suffering in a way such that its recognition is 
seen as obvious in the collective horror it invokes. However, what would it mean to think about 
suffering and empathy in ways that do not subscribe to the obvious and universal nature of the 
European Enlightenment logic of Reason? It is important to complicate the modern, western 
notion of empathy in order to acknowledge the layers of power and colonialism in which it is 
entrenched.  
           To do this type of work, it is necessary to not only think about alternative ways of relating 
with concepts such as empathy, compassion, sympathy, and care; but also to refrain from 
translating these subaltern concepts into modern, western, or ‘rational’ ways of thinking. In fact, 
this may mean that these ideas might not be completely understandable to the modern, western 
subject. However, this is welcomed. Perhaps it is better to search for “empathies that open up 
rather than resolve, that mutate rather than assimilate, and that invent rather than transcribe” 
(Pedwell 27). The untranslatability of some concepts may serve to unsettle the modern, western 
audience; thus bringing to the surface its discomfort with the lack of universality and 
																																																								
15 Kumarakulasingam, Narendran. “Bloody Translations: The Politics of International Compassion and Horror.” 
Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 1. (1), 2014, pp. 61-75. 
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smoothness. “Bennett is seeking ‘empathy not grounded in affinity (feeling for another insofar 
as we can imagine being that other) but on a feeling for another that entails an encounter with 
something irreducible and different, often inaccessible’” (Hite 57). This empathic unsettlement 
allows for an understanding of difference that accepts the inaccessibility and perhaps 
unattainability of various forms of empathy. “For Gayatri Spivak, for example, translation ‘is the 
most intimate act of reading’, and a translation practice that does not simply reproduce neo-
colonial paradigms requires that the translator be motivated by ‘love’ – not as a romantic ideal, 
but rather as a ‘surrender to the text’” (Pedwell 21). Perhaps this love is necessary in a re-
conceptualization and reconsideration of understood notions of modern, western ideas of 
empathy. However, it is necessary to abstain from thinking of these other forms of feeling as a 
lack, as this would contribute to an additional violence and imposition of one ‘superior’ form of 
empathy. It is also important to try not to universalize these alternative ways of relating with the 
world, but rather to attempt to engage in an intimate translation of these emotions and affects 
through love.  
           In order to explore the various modes of ‘nonwestern’ or ‘non-modern’ empathy, it is 
necessary to think through the European Enlightenment form of sympathy, as described by Smith 
and Hume. In his consideration of various forms of sympathy in Provincializing Europe, Dipesh 
Chakrabarty writes, “the capacity to notice and document suffering (even if it be one’s own 
suffering) from the position of a generalized and necessarily disembodied observer is what marks 
the beginnings of the modern self” (Chakrabarty 119)16. In this way of thinking, the ability to 
feel sympathy for another is inherent in human nature, not specific to one or a few. Another 
particularity of the sympathy of the modern subject relies on a certain self-recognition of the Self 
in the Other. As Adam Smith wrote, “‘we sometimes feel for another ... because, when we put 
ourselves in his case, that passion arises in our breast from the imagination’” (Chakrabarty 126). 
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What might it mean to think of sympathy or empathy in a way that does not center the Self? 
How can we think of Omran as deserving of respect because he is another human being, not 
because he ‘could have been my brother or myself’? What is it that constricts our ways of feeling 
such that we are only to feel for another when a sense of sameness is involved?  
           Perhaps it is useful to acknowledge other forms of ‘feeling with’ that have, at times, 
conflicted with dominant European notions of sympathy. In the Bengali concept, shahanubhuti 
and its inborn capacity of having hriday (heart), it is possible to feel with another person without 
the identification of a Self in the Other. “The capacity for shahanubhuti (shaha = equal, 
anubhuti = feelings) was, unlike in European theory of sympathy, not dependent on a naturally 
given mental faculty like ‘imagination’; it was seen rather as a characteristic of the person with 
hriday, the word ‘hriday’ being assimilated in the nineteenth century to the English word ‘heart’” 
(Chakrabarty 126). As a matter of fact, hriday was seen as quite rare, as only a few possessed it, 
making it exemplary and exceptional, rather than universal. Possessing hriday, “...an excess of 
compassion in one’s character was a rare gift from the world of the gods” (Chakrabarty 129). 
What might it mean to think about feeling in this way? What are the translation practices 
involved in our attempts to understand alternative modes of feeling throughout the world? How 
might this be useful in our conceptions of how to relate with other humans, especially through 
encounters with shock-pictures of object-victims?  
           When thinking through “alternative topographies of the self” as Appadurai calls for17, as 
well as other ways of thinking about various types of feeling and sentiment, it is imperative to 
refrain from seeing these as temporally prior, as that would impose a violent western, modern, 
linear, and progressive timeline upon other forms of living. It is not useful, either, to attempt to 
universalize concepts such as hriday due to the imposing translation practices that might require. 
However, it is important to think through these alternative ways of feeling, as this aids one’s 
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interpretation of the empathy that is invoked when looking at shock-pictures, such as 
Omran’s. There are so many other examples of subaltern ways of relating to feeling, as described 
in Sneja Gunew’s Subaltern Empathy: Beyond European Categories in Affect Theory18, which 
may be useful to one’s way of thinking about violence and suffering. These modes of being in 
the world offer an entry point into another kind of thinking, which could be more empathetic 





“Come, look straight into my eyes, attack my heart. 















19 Shah, Sadia Qasim. “Violence Replaces Romance in New Pashto Songs.” Chitral Today, 19 November 2012. 
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Part II: The Politics of Language 
           Perhaps it is not a failure of empathy that is to blame in the problematic international 
response to drone strikes, victims, and images. Instead, it might be a failure of imagination and, 
above all, language. It is helpful to go beyond the limits of the European Enlightenment, 
‘modern’ form of empathy and to focus on the politics of language. After thinking through the 
need for alternative forms of feeling, it is also imperative to investigate the forms of language 
and their functions within the international geopolitical sphere, in relation to the violence of 
drone strikes.  
~~~ 
In response to drone operators, who refer to kills as ‘bug splats,’ an art installation in Khyber 
Pukhtoonkhwa, Pakistan, challenged this by trying to change the way the drone sees its ‘targets.’ 
The child in the poster lost both of her parents and two siblings in a drone strike.20   
~~~ 
 
The Power of Abstraction: 
           Language has a tremendously important function in the deployment of words in warfare. 
Each carefully chosen, imagined, invented word (or set of words) is surrounded by a web of 
meanings and politics. The language surrounding drone strikes and, more generally, modern 
warfare in the 21st century, is used for very intentional purposes. Three functions of this 
language, which I will describe later on, stem from its abstract, vague, and ambiguous nature. 
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The purposes of the language used by defenders of drone strikes are: 1. To detach the U.S. 
public from the realities of political violences (in which it is inherently complicit), reflecting the 
nature of the violence of drone strikes; 2. To simplify and reduce the complexities of political 
violence so that the binaries that arise from, and are deployed by, the ‘war on terror’ seem 
obvious, which perpetrates the imperialist, colonialist, capitalist, and patriarchal violences of the 
U.S. with little to no ‘valid’ objections; and 3. To perpetuate and employ the economistic 
language and way of thinking about the world such that humans are seen as and are reduced to 
numbers (through statistics, reports, or their invisibility within these evidence-based forms of 
proof and truth). This contributes to the notion that certain lives are more valuable than others.  
           First, it is necessary to identify and problematize certain key terminologies that are used in 
the context of drone strikes and the ‘war on terror.’ These terms are “closely linked with an 
entire vocabulary of equally questionable concepts, each of which has its own history” (Collins 
164)21. The language that must be questioned, defined, and rethought include these terms: 
‘civilization,’ ‘barbarism,’ ‘evil,’ ‘justice,’ ‘targets,’ ‘precision,’ ‘efficiency,’ ‘collateral 
damage,’ ‘side effects,’ ‘terrorism,’ and ‘cowardice,’ to name a few. This vocabulary is 
employed by those who defend military violence of the U.S. or “defense intellectuals,” as Carol 
Cohn refers to them.22  Terms such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘barbarism,’ for example, clearly denote an 
essentialist binary of ‘our’ violence versus ‘their’ type of killing. State violence is never defined 
through terms of ‘terrorism,’ but rather as self-defense or necessary violence in the best interest 
of the nation. Terms such as ‘barbarism’ invoke an added violence of relocating the actor of the 
violence temporally and spatially elsewhere, often with racial undertones. These terminologies 
are entrenched with a web of meanings and uses that benefit the American war machine, while 
invalidating the political and human needs and voices of the Other.  
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22 Cohn, Carol. “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.” Signs, Vol. 12, No. 4, Within and 
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           The first function of this highly abstract language, which cannot necessarily be defined, 
yet elicits such recognition in the modern West, is dangerous for many reasons. Above all, this 
language contributes to the project of condemning, depoliticizing, and negating certain types of 
political violence, rendering them ‘unthinkable,’ while ignoring the imperialist and colonialist 
violences of the modern West. This legitimizes certain types of violence, while dismissing other 
types as ‘barbaric,’ ‘evil,’ and ‘unimaginable.’ This language, when used by the web of western 
institutions (the government, academy, think tanks, corporations, the military, and the media), 
gains power and legitimacy without questioning its history, function, and propagandist purposes. 
For example, as John Collins describes in his chapter entitled “Terrorism,” in the book Collateral 
Language23, the political violence committed by the U.S. and its allies can never be described as 
‘terrorism,’ and instead is justifiable through terms such as ‘counterinsurgency,’ 
‘counterterrorism,’ ‘low-intensity conflict,’ ‘self-defense,’ and ‘war.’ In other words, any 
violence committed by the U.S. (and/or its allies), is viewed as legitimate, necessary, and 
political; whereas, violence committed against the U.S. (and/or its allies) is automatically 
categorized as ‘terrorist,’ ‘barbaric,’ ‘radical,’ and ‘evil,’ as it threatens the ‘goodness,’ 
‘innocence,’ and ‘democracy’ of the U.S. and the modern West. 
           Any discourse used to defend drone strikes and the violence that they create inherently 
invokes an additional violence, which stems from the nature of this abstract language. When 
speaking about the victims of drone strikes, “military language in the media softens the visceral 
impact of the violence on ordinary citizens...” (Collins 8). Instead of using language such as 
‘casualties,’ ‘collateral damage,’ ‘side effects,’ or ‘unintended targets,’ could it ever be 
imaginable for the media, or those defense intellectuals, to speak of drone strike violences and 
their victims in human terms? What if, instead of an ‘airstrike,’ this violence was reported in 
terms of ‘mass murder’ or ‘widespread killings of innocent people?’ Or perhaps ‘a family was 
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just murdered in Syria/Pakistan/Yemen, etc.’? Could we24 ever be exposed to their distorted 
bodies or bloody limbs? What would this mean for our understandings of this violence? The 
viscerality and human compassion of the listener, viewer, or reader would be avowed, rather than 
their indifference or emotional separation. “To speak of ‘collateral damage’ is a far cry from 
acknowledging the blown-off limbs, the punctured eardrums, the shrapnel wounds, and the 
psychological horror that are caused by heavy bombardment; even speaking of ‘civilian 
casualties’ deflects attention from the real effects of the bomb” (Collins 8).  
           This language sanitizes, without speaking to the emotional aspect of relating with other 
humans. “This language has enormous destructive power, but without the emotional fallout, 
without the emotional fallout that would result if it were clear one was talking about plans for 
mass murder, mangled bodies, and unspeakable human suffering” (Cohn 691). This additional 
violence mimics, reflects, and perpetuates the detached and removed violence of drone strikes, 
which emphasizes the “astounding chasm between image and reality that characterizes techno-
strategic language” literally far away from the violence in the physical reality of drone strikes, 
and figuratively in the theoretical abstraction of this language (Cohn 692).  
           This linguistic reflection of the actual violence of drone strikes serves the purpose of 
familiarizing, normalizing, and making less strange the violence of drone strikes upon fellow 
human beings, thus making this type of violence seem acceptable and necessary. The ways in 
which the media, military, academy, and other facets of the ‘institutional web’ speak about drone 
strikes and their victims assures the public that this new technological weapon is the obvious 
choice. Or better yet, that there was no choice and that they needed to deploy these weapons out 
of ‘self defense’ and for the purpose of protecting American values and interests. Perhaps this 
may come at the ‘cost’ or ‘price’ of some. But of course, this was unintentional and necessary. 
This discourse has disturbing underlying assumptions and implications. The economistic 
																																																								
24 When using the language of ‘we’ and ‘our’ in this paragraph, I am speaking about those who locate themselves 
within the so-called ‘modern West,’ which I have described in the fifth footnote. 
	 26	
language refers to a certain way of thinking about the world that reduces some humans to 
numbers and stems from the implied understandings of certain lives as more valuable than other 
lives. American troops are spared thanks to the detachment of drones, at the expense of some 
casualties.  
           In Carol Cohn’s Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals25, the 
‘rational,’ economistic, and gendered way of thinking about the world in Cohn’s encounter with 
nuclear strategic analysis is exposed and questioned. In her brilliant work, Cohn outlines the 
irony and hypocrisy of the language used by “defense intellectuals” and the purposes of their 
abstract and euphemistic terms, as well as the sexual and patriarchal subtext (Cohn 687). 
Equating disarmament with emasculation, nuclear weapons with sexual domination and 
conquest, Air Force Magazine’s advertisements for new weapons with Playboy’s catalog of 
images of men’s sexual fantasies demonstrates the underlying sexual implications of the appeal 
of this type of violence. In addition, Cohn emphasizes the competitive masculinity that in turn 
ties into patriarchal ideas of virginity, familiarization, domestication, and normalization of 
weapons in relation to nuclear discourse. “To have human bodies remain invisible in that 
technological world precisely because that world itself now includes the domestic, the human, 
the warm, and playful” (Cohn 699) is another way in which language distorts, disturbs, and 
inverts notions of human compassion or care, replacing them with seemingly friendly or familiar 
ways of thinking about destruction. “The imagery that domesticates, that humanizes insentient 
weapons, may also serve, paradoxically, to make it all right to ignore sentient human bodies, 
human lives” (Cohn 699). This language is used specifically in order to make some humans 
become less deserving of compassion, respect, and decency. “Sanitized abstraction and sexual 
and patriarchal imagery, even if disturbing, seemed to fit easily into the masculinist world of 
nuclear war planning” (Cohn 697). The seemingly ‘rational’ or ‘obvious’ nature of the nuclear 
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discourse of these defense intellectuals is exposed and questioned in the reconsidering of their 
patriarchal, sexual, and sanitized language.  
           The common theme that arises from the language used by those who defend drone strikes 
and defense intellectuals is the use of economistic terms in order to render certain acts of 
political violence as thinkable. The numericized way of thinking about the world and about other 
humans in the world has direct connections with the economization of bodies under colonial rule. 
“The ‘numerical gaze’ has functioned quite well in a number of ways in the contemporary 
international system. It has, among other things, acted to constitute, unilaterally, the ostensibly 
universal and seemingly objective character of the categories and modes of knowing of the 
colonizer” (Muppidi 51-52)26. It is not incidental that the language used by defenders of drone 
strikes includes a combination of abstracted and detached language (when speaking of violence 
on human bodies) and hyper-specific language (when referring to the main point of reference, 
the weapon itself). Using the drone as a form of extension of colonization into the sky, while 
disavowing the fears, emotions, and stories of the full human lives, who are seen as ‘targets,’ 
‘side effects,’ and ‘collateral damage,’ demonstrates that the economistic language used in 
historical colonial rule is not, by any means, over. As a matter of fact, it is the technology of the 
drone that assists the project of defense intellectuals, as its removed, detached, distant, and 
impersonal nature normalizes the abstracted language that is used to speak of the violence caused 
by this new weapon. It is necessary to pay attention to the functions of this type of insidious 
language, as it masks the true destruction and fear that seeps into the lives of so many people. By 
giving meaning to certain lives, by valuing them more than others, as we can see in the 
economistic and abstract language used to describe the victims of drone strikes, as deployed by 
those who truly see them as ‘side effects’ and ‘collateral damage,’ the perpetuation of colonial 
violence continues. 
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           Iterations of this abstracted language have become normalized in the current 
administration and the political climate in which it inhabits. An excerpt from a New York Times 
article entitled “Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism 
Rules”27 makes explicit this economization and prioritization of certain subjects over others: 
“On Jan. 28, Mr. Trump signed a presidential national security memorandum directing the 
military to give him a plan within 30 days to defeat the Islamic State. It said the plan should 
include ‘recommended changes to any United States rules of engagement and other United 
States policy restrictions that exceed the requirements of international law regarding the 
use of force,’ a veiled reference to rescinding the 2013 limits on airstrikes. 
But the momentum for rapid change broke, the officials said, after the Yemen raid, which 
resulted in numerous civilian deaths, including of children; the death of a member of the 
Navy’s SEAL Team 6 and the wounding of three others; and the loss of a $75 million 
aircraft.” 
 
It is only when one of us (of the U.S) 
 -Our troops or Our drone- 
Is killed or wounded 
 
That the murder of hundreds  
Of thousands 
Of lives—of mothers, fathers, children, sisters, brothers, grandmothers and grandfathers 
Aunts and uncles and best friends and teachers and neighbors 
 
Is interrupted and put on pause; 
The momentum then breaks 
When the drone is injured 
 
Because the life of the (war) machine 
Is more valuable than 
                     The mangled bodies  




27 Savage, Charlie and Eric Schmitt. “Trump Administration is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism 
Rules.” The New York Times, 12 March 2017, p. A15.  
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The (Lacking) Language of Legality: 
           When speaking about the ‘rightness’ of drone strikes, those who criticize these airstrikes 
often invoke the language of legality. If drone strikes are viewed as ‘extrajudicial,’ they are 
obviously deemed as ‘wrong’ or ‘illegal.’ However, would this mean that something is only seen 
as wrong if it is located outside of legality? Is this the only premise for objection in modern, 
western thought? If certain actions are only objected to based on their legal status (or lack 
thereof), what would this mean for an understanding of what is right and what is wrong? Would 
an action, airstrike, or attack only be viewed as unjust or wrong if it is deemed such by its 
exclusion from the written and documented law? If the same action were to be viewed as legal, 
would that change its sense of what is right or ethical? Should there be another basis for 
condemnation other than its legal standing, or is this enough? However, if one feels morally 
sound with their concept of the law as an ethical guiding point, what might they respond with 
when presented with issues of immoral or unethical laws throughout history? It is no secret that 
several unjust policies and atrocities were once justified by the law of the land. Who decides 
what the law should or should not be? Is it not the case that only the powerful have complete 
control over the law? Who, then, would have the responsibility of interpreting the law? Perhaps 
this might call into question the concept of legality as an ethical point of departure. However, 
this presents questions about what might guide a person’s notion of what is right and what is 
wrong in the world. If it is only a law that prevents people from murdering one another, what 
would it mean if this were to be deemed lawful?  
           In an Amnesty International Report on drone strikes, entitled “Will I be Next?: U.S. 
Drone Strikes in Pakistan,”28 the condemnations and objections of those who have conducted and 
wrote this report, mostly stem from the legality of the killings. “Amnesty International is 
seriously concerned that these strikes may have resulted in unlawful killings, constituting 
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extrajudicial executions or war crimes. Like the more recent drone strikes covered by this 
report, all of the killings carried out by U.S. pilotless aircraft in Pakistan have been conducted in 
virtual secrecy aided by the remote and lawless nature of the region...” (Amnesty 14). Not only 
does this part of the report express concern only if the law has been broken by this killing, but 
also has posited blame (that perhaps should be placed upon the U.S. government) upon the 
“lawless nature of the region,” as if their form of law is a lack. However, perhaps a lack should 
instead be posited upon what the U.S. lacks in humanity in its colonization of the sky in so many 
areas, especially in this part of North Waziristan. “If the attack occurred outside any actual 
armed conflict, then it would have violated the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of the right to 
life, and could constitute extrajudicial executions. It is the responsibility of the U.S. authorities to 
present the legal and factual justification for this attack” (Amnesty 27). Amnesty International 
calls for the legal and evidential justification of the attack, which might then absolve 
perpetuators of violence of any blame or guilt. However, is it only this justification that would 
determine if this action was morally right? The main concern with signature strikes in Amnesty’s 
report is that “such strikes are likely to lead to unlawful killings. They appear to be incompatible 
with the requirements of human rights law and, where applicable, could also lead to violations of 
international humanitarian law” (Amnesty 28). This legal language is problematic, due to its 
preference of the law and legality (or lack thereof) over objections stemming from human 
compassion, love, or kindness. Moving beyond concerns of the law, their critique can go deeper 
here.  
 
Reducing Lives to Labor 
           However, this report also includes stories from those who live at the other end of this 
violence: drone strike victims, family members, and people who live in the community. This 
inclusion of stories from victims, survivors, and family members is rare in many reports in the 
mass media and in news stories. However, even though Amnesty has included these voices, they 
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are modified and tailored to adapt to the modern, western language and form of valuing 
humans. On July 6, 2012, a group of “laborers” from Zowi Sidgi village had gathered under a 
tent after work and were killed and injured by drone strikes (Amnesty 24). This attack killed 
eighteen people and injured twenty-two of those who were either at the tent to begin with or who 
came to the scene afterwards, becoming victims of an additional missile attack. Although the 
report includes some of the voices and stories of those who witnessed this event, when listing the 
names of those who were killed by the drone strike on the Zowi Sidgi village, the only 
information about these victims that was provided along with their names is their age, 
occupation, and marital status.  
           However, it is worth examining the selection of information included here. How has a 
person’s occupation and age become the most important information about them? Is there not an 
addition violence here of reducing the lives of the victims to their occupation or age? Is “Saleh 
Khan (aged 14), sold wood” really an accurate or full encapsulation of a human’s life (Amnesty 
25)? This violence is located in the capitalist and economistic way of thinking about people in 
the world, such that it is thinkable for human lives to be reduced to their occupation or work. It is 
worth wondering why and how this became an adequate representation of human beings. Why is 
there not at least a recognition of a certain type of violence in this lack of sufficient information 
about the victims? Perhaps doing justice to the memory of those killed in this attack was not a 
priority for this report. Even this Amnesty International report, which includes a great deal of 
information and many different perspectives, may not be the most ethical approach to thinking 
about this violence, as it perpetuates certain violences in its focus on legality and the reduction of 
humans to their occupation, marital status, and age. 
           In the language of those who criticize drone strikes, moral and ethical claims are used. 
Just war theorists and humanitarians speak of proportionality and asymmetry, yet neglect to 
engage with the underlying colonial power relationships in the geopolitical sphere. These 
	 32	
arguments also fail to include the voices of those at the other end of this violence, and when 
they do (as the Amnesty International report demonstrates), it conforms to the modern, western 
language and way of valuing humans. Only paying attention to and valuing the legality and 
‘documented evidence’ of these killings is incurring an additional violence on behalf of well-
meaning humanitarians and just war theorists.  
~~~ 
“Names of the Dead II 
Floyd Cheung 
 
of the ones we don’t know 
of the ones not published in The New York Times 
 
of those who fight on the other side 
of those who are caught in between 
 
of their hometowns, ages, and 
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Part III: Complicating the First World Imaginary 
           In this section, I am interested in complicating the modern, western political imaginary, or 
drawing from Judith Butler, the “first world privilege”, and the ways in which drone strikes are 
perceived by this way of thinking (Butler xii) 30. The sanitization and detachment that stem from 
the notion that drone strikes are ‘precise,’ ‘efficient,’ and ‘effective’ (and therefore morally just) 
should be questioned. In this section, I will challenge the form of thinking that emerges from this 
hegemonic political imaginary by comparing the violence of drone strikes with the violence of 
suicide bombings as well as the international response to these types of killing. I am not 
attempting to justify or condone either type of violence, but rather to challenge the notion that 
one type of killing is morally superior to another. It is worth questioning why suicide bombings 
are seen in the modern West as barbaric, backward, horrific, and repugnant, whereas drone 
strikes are viewed as clean, sanitized, detached, and efficient. Here, I will look into the ways in 
which the suicide bomber inverts the modern, western political imaginary and the reasons for 
which this way of thinking dismisses this violence as temporally prior, horrific, and morally 
wrong.  
 
Uncovering Conflicting Conceptions of Horror and Justice: 
           It is useful to think about the figure of the suicide bomber and what this figure represents. 
In accounts and reports of suicide bombings, the person who commits the violence is always 
seen as having no respect or regard for human life. However, how did it become more 
‘respectful’ or somehow better to push a button from thousands of miles away, seeing the 
destruction that has been created as collateral damage or as a side effect? The suicide bomber, on 
the other hand, inverts the modern, liberal sense of justice by dying with their victims. However, 
in some modes of thinking, this action may show a certain respect for the humanity of those who 
they have killed. In some ways, this places suicide bombers in a different moral positionality, 
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due to their willingness to be hurt. Suicide bombers have been called ‘cowardly’ for their 
actions, whereas drone strike operators have been lauded for their ‘precision’ and ‘efficiency’ 
and then studied for the trauma that they have undergone through their killings. How do these 
contradictions make sense? Is this even about the different types of violence being deployed or is 
something else happening here?  
           Perhaps the horror in the response to suicide bombings could be attributed to a certain 
‘modern’ way of thinking of the world, which positions the West as somehow ‘ahead’ on the 
progressive, linear timeline of history. The notion that the modern West is always one step ahead 
on the ladder of development or somehow always earlier to arrive at modernization, which, in 
the eyes of the West, is equivalent to civilization, is problematic in many ways. The nature of the 
violence of drone strikes and that of suicide bombings should not be ignored. Following 
Chamayou’s argument in A Theory of the Drone31, the violence of drones requires that there is 
complete disengagement, whereas the suicide bomber is predicated on their complete 
engagement. In the case of the latter, the body is the weapon. In the case of the former, however, 
the weapon has no body. In contrast to Walter Benjamin’s evolutionist description of the 
temporality of emergence of the kamikaze and the drone, Chamayou argues that they “did not 
succeed each other chronologically, one following from the other as history follows from 
prehistory, on the contrary, they emerged together, as two opposed but historically simultaneous 
tactics” (Chamayou 84). In this way, Chamayou questions the temporal categorization of certain 
forms of violence as older or prehistoric, and others as modern.  
           Chamayou also recognizes the geopolitical economic power structures at play when 
thinking about various types of violence. When speaking about suicide bombings versus drone 
strikes, Chamayou writes, “The polarity is primarily economic. It sets those who have nothing 
but their bodies with which to fight in opposition to those who possess capital and technology” 
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(Chamayou 86). This acknowledgement of the ways in which economic forces have a direct 
role in the deployment of various types of violence and the forms that they take is astute and 
necessary in thinking about the reasons for which different types of killing are used. It is helpful 
to think about the economic inequity and disproportion here, as this is an important element that 
is overlooked in dominant narratives surrounding drone strikes and suicide bombings. “A 
member of Hamas stated that ‘we utilize martyrs because we don’t have the F16s, the Apaches, 
the tanks and missiles’” (Cavarero 95)32. With one ‘side’ of the violence unable to have access to 
the types of weapons that are used against them, the uneven aspect of this ‘modern warfare’ is 
constrictive. However, viewing suicide bombers as having a lesser sense of respect for life 
disregards the economic pressures and inability to have their voices heard otherwise.  
           Another element of the modern, western political imaginary’s attitude toward suicide 
bombings is their location of this violence as temporally elsewhere. This positing of a certain 
type of killing in the temporal past is an additional violence, as it contributes to the imposition of 
the modern, progressive, linear timeline of the western hegemony upon the subaltern. A 
component that is particular to a type of colonial western modernization is the condemnation of 
ways of relating with the world that are viewed as outside of its own political imaginary. 
However, it is not solely the insistence of this location of suicide bombings in the past that is 
occurring, but also a recognition of suicide bombings in the West’s own historic past. This 
imposition of ‘our’ past onto the ‘other’s’ temporal present is essential in the modern, western, 





















Laila Shawa (Palestine), Birds of Paradise, 2011. Photography and mixed media on canvas. 
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The Location of Immorality Elsewhere: 
           An additional aspect of this western neocolonialism that is being deployed through this 
attitude towards the violence of drone strikes and suicide bombings is the othering of moral 
repugnance. However, it takes a lot of political work for this belief that drone strikes are morally 
superior to be assumed. As Chamayou invokes in his book, Eyad El-Sarraj, the director of the 
mental health program in Gaza asks, “‘How can you believe in your own humanity if you do not 
believe in the humanity of the enemy?’” Chamayou then poses the questions: “In what respect 
might it be less horrible to kill without exposing oneself than to share the fate of one’s victims? 
In what respect might a weapon making it possible to kill without danger be less repugnant than 
the opposite?” (Chamayou 88). This reversal of the dominant narrative that has been displayed, 
perpetuated, and performed, explores the possibility for difference in thought and perspective. In 
questioning the western narrative and justification for drone strikes, which claims their moral 
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superiority, Jacqueline Rose asks why “‘dying with your victim should be seen as a greater sin 
than saving yourself’” (Chamayou 88). In this way, it is understandable how some might view 
drone attacks as cowardly, as opposed to moral.  
           Talal Asad proposes the idea that the repugnance activated in the modern West in its 
response to suicide bombings might be a result of the inability to enact a certain type of justice. 
“By dying with his victim, coagulating both crime and punishment within a single action, he 
makes punishment impossible and thereby deactivates the fundamental resort of a form of justice 
conceived in the penal mode. He will never be able to ‘pay for what he has done’” (Chamayou 
88). After having been horrified by the presence of a suicide bomber and their actions, a witness 
will draw from this experience of seeing this shock a certain “righteous anger directed at the 
perpetrator of the deadly violence” (Asad 89)33. However, it would be interesting to wonder why 
this manifestation of justice becomes a desire for revenge or vengeance. Following Asad’s 
argument, the understanding of the horror in response to suicide bombings stems from the nature 
of its crime and thus there exists a desire to punish the perpetrator of this crime. However, this 
act combines crime and punishment, which disavows the realization of any desire for revenge or 
justice. It might be useful to question this obsessive craving for vengeance when responding to 
horror or death. Why must this always be the immediate reaction instead of searching for a 
different type of mourning or dealing with loss?  
           I understand the wish for justice, especially after a wrongful death has occurred. It is not 
my intention to dismiss or negate valid feelings that arise after horrific and heartbreaking killings 
occur. However, it might be necessary to interrogate that which leads to this justice. Why is it 
revenge or vengeance that must lead to a desire for justice? Is there another way of thinking 
about justice and dealing with grief and loss without immediately resorting to a militant revenge 
to lead us there? In Emile Durkheim’s thesis on criminal law, he describes that “all legal 
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punishment is based on a sense of popular outrage and is therefore motivated by passionate 
vengeance” (Asad 90). The question of why suicide bombing, specifically, is viewed as horrific, 
shocking, and intolerable may stem from a certain Judeo-Christian way of viewing the meaning 
of life in terms of, and centering, death. This relies on a love for all the dead, which is then 
unachievable in the case of suicide bombings. “This is impossible on the occasion of a suicide 
bombing because there is no redemption there – none for the perpetrator, none for the victims, 
and none for those who witness or contemplate the event” (Asad 91). Perhaps the only way of 
viewing the destruction of innocent lives is when it fits into the modern, western sense of justice 
and when it ‘makes sense’ to this way of thinking.  
           If the violence of drone strikes does not adhere to humanitarian or human rights law, and 
if these attacks are located outside of modern warfare (as the U.S. did not declare war on 
Pakistan or Yemen), then why have drone strikes become a violence that is morally superior to 
other types of killings? Perhaps the difference here also arises from the fact that drone strikes are 
located within the realm of state violence, whereas suicide bombings are seen as completely 
outside of the sphere of law. “But the law itself is founded by and continuously depends on 
coercive violence” (Asad 92). The language of legality here also serves to justify certain acts, 
while condemning others for the purpose of maintaining the rationality of violence that ‘makes 
sense,’ while denouncing that which may not. Another reason for which the abstract language of 
legality is used so often in the discourse surrounding drone strikes originates from the nature of 
this type of violence, as it relegates the human body to the periphery. As Adriana Cavarero 
describes: 
“Occupying the entire war scene and consigning it to the imaginary, the high-precision 
destructive machine, translated into digitized images, transforms the body of the warrior 
into a peripheral element of its mechanism, rendering it unworthy of media focus... In a 
‘post-heroic’ war that no longer requires the tribute of blood and aspires to a ‘zero 
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casualty option’ for its robotized soldiers, the engineering of devastation triumphs 
over bodies and swallows them up, concealing them” (Cavarero 94).  
         The invisibility of bodies in this new construction of war demonstrates the manipulation 
that the modern West utilizes in order to create the perception of a body-less war. Without the 
constraint of having to confront and engage with the bodies of those who have been killed from 
afar, the killing machine of the high-precision drone claims a certain moral superiority, which 
arises from the falsehood that their violence has no victims.  
 
The Imposition of Suicide Language: 
           Taking a step back here, it is necessary to rethink the language of the modern, western 
classification of terminologies of those who carry out killings, while sacrificing their own lives, 
as ‘suicide bombers.’ In working through the politics of this language, it is useful to understand 
the ways in which this lexical characterization might be problematic. It is imperative to closely 
examine the ways in which the modern West defines this violence, as opposed to the ways in 
which the people who carry out this violence would describe it. This stems from a certain way of 
thinking about death in different types of relating with the world. For example, the ways in 
which the modern West relates with death is through concepts such as murder, homicide, and 
suicide. However, the usage of the term ‘suicide’ may be an imposition upon other ways of 
thinking about this type of death.  
           Before opening this discourse up to other ways of relating to this type of violence (or 
sacrifice), it might be helpful to think of other ways in which the modern West has imposed the 
concept of ‘suicide’ upon other ways of relating with death. An example of the imposition of this 
term upon that which might be characterized otherwise is present in the case of Roop Kanwar’s 
death. Roop Kanwar has become a controversial figure, as she was a devotee of the Goddess 
Rani Sati and, after her husband’s death, was said to want to become a sati, which would mean 
that she would sacrifice herself upon the funeral pyre of her husband. There have been 
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conflicting reports in the media, with some accounts attributing her death to pressure and 
taunting from her family, thus forcing her to die. Other accounts, however, have attributed her 
death to her devotion to the Goddess Rani Sati and her wish to become a sati. In some of these 
media accounts, violent language has been used in order to temporally relocate this religious 
practice, “‘On September 23, Home Minister Buta Singh declared the sati incident to be 
reminiscent of the ‘dark ages’” and others posed the sati as an “archaic and inhuman practice” 
(Goswami 203).34 These modes of speaking about sati reflect a temporal displacement through 
this language, which serves to invalidate these religious practices. In many news reports of this 
event, western media only used concepts of suicide in order to talk about this death, if the agency 
were given to her. Acknowledging the fact that this event is far more complicated than I can 
discuss in this context, that no one will know what Roop Kanwar was thinking at the time, and 
that any imposition of a political interpretation upon her is violent due to the fact that she is 
unable to make her voice heard, it is useful to think about this case as well as the response to it.  
           This imposition of a certain way of thinking about death demonstrates a problematic 
inability to imagine other forms of relating with death. When thinking about the various and 
plural modes of encountering and understanding death, it is helpful to reconsider the ways in 
which western notions of death categories, such as ‘suicide’ and ‘murder,’ impose upon that 
which might be defined otherwise. Perhaps ‘sacrifice’ or ‘martyrdom’ have become located in 
the temporal and political past. I am making this comparison not to think of these types of deaths 
as similar in any way. As a matter of fact, there are many differences in the nature and 
motivations for these deaths. However, I do believe it is useful to think about other examples of 
the modern West’s infliction of concepts such as ‘suicide’ upon those who may relate to the 
death in other ways.  
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           In the case of what the West refers to as ‘suicide bombings,’ those who enact this 
violence may not define their actions as such. For many of them, this way of dying with their 
victims and their sense of sacrifice stems from a certain respect for the humanity of their victims. 
“Going by the news reports, the Western imaginary seems to be struck above all by the 
scandalousness of the suicidal act as a manifestation of disdain for human life, in particular for 
one’s own” (Cavarero 92).35 However, there also are many examples, which Cavarero draws 
upon, of figures in the West’s own historical past, who have used military strategies in war, who 
have knowingly faced their certain death. These examples, though, have not been categorized as 
suicides. “A famous example in this respect (not by chance an integral part of the schooling of 
children in Europe) might be the episode of Leonidas and the three hundred Spartans, who fell 
gloriously at Thermopylae” (Cavarero 92). In addition, Cavarero draws from the example of 
Pietro Micca, who became a heroic martyr after lighting a fuse in order to blow up a tunnel, 
leading to Turin, which he knew would also blow himself up. In this way, “the figure of the 
martyr-suicide is not entirely unknown to the Western tradition” (Cavarero 92). So, then, what is 
truly new or particularly scandalous about this type of violence?  
           In response to this question, it is necessary to consider the reasons for which this horror 
arises. Perhaps it is due to the horrific images of the defenseless victims who were killed by this 
act, rather than the suicidal element. However, this would not follow, as the violence of 
“decorporealized destructive technology,” such as drone strikes, also creates defenseless victims 
(Cavarero 95). The myth of precision, efficiency, and accuracy would counter the 
acknowledgement of the corpses they have created. Essential to the project of drone strikes and 
their violence is the dismissal and ignorance of the destruction of so many lives on the other end. 
However, the anger and pain that are generated from this type of remote-controlled killing leads 
to a certain desire to have the voices of those living at the other end of drone violence heard in 
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some way. Although there is an inability to make their voices heard politically, as the source 
of destruction under which they live is located thousands of miles away from them, the last resort 
might be violence. So, then, why has this violence become viewed as irregular, illegitimate, 
unfair, and thus depoliticized when the violence of drone strikes remains valid in the political 
realm?  
 
Rethinking the Role of Figures of Female Suicide Bombers: 
           Another interesting element in the discourse surrounding ‘suicide bombings’ stems from 
the ways in which women who enact this violence are spoken about in the modern, western 
political imaginary. There is often an urge to treat these female suicide bombers as passive 
victims of outside pressures and patriarchal oppression, rather than active, intentional agents. 
The need to identify these women as helpless sufferers who “have no way out” may be attributed 
to the assumed “subordinate role of women in Islamic society” (Cavarero 100). This location of 
women as helpless, oppressed, and defenseless is violent in its racist undertones. I do not wish to 
imagine that I could know or understand what it means to these women who take up arms and 
become ‘suicide bombers.’ Perhaps they are driven to this position due to manipulation, pressure, 
or force. However, I do not want to perpetuate the violence of assuming that they are in a 
position of helplessness. The maternal role of women comes into play here, which adds to the 
shocking quality of this type of horror, when a woman, “whom we would expect to be a 
caregiver” creates such destruction (Cavarero 101). The female suicide bomber is “a female body 
that age-old tradition, both in the East and in the West, has always regarded as extraneous to the 
masculine realm of violence and historically destined to undergo it rather than perpetuate it” 
(Cavarero 100). This complicated concept of a female figure as a body bomber is one that must 
be engaged with in the disturbance of a simple binary of horrific suicide bombings and sanitized, 
detached drone strikes. 
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           In many ways, the imposition of horror upon suicide bombings and the subsequent 
othering of moral repugnance while neglecting to confront the destruction that drone strikes 
create is constitutive of the modern, western colonial project. It is a continuation of the binary 
that the modern West believes in, which is that of the civilized versus the uncivilized, the moral 
versus the repugnant, the modern versus the backward, and the humane versus the cruel. 
However, it is necessary to complicate, question, and rethink these rigid binaries, as they serve to 
simplify and make obvious certain ways of thinking about the world, while negating others. The 
conception of the violence of drone strikes as somehow clean, sanitized, removed, detached, 
precise, efficient, and thus morally superior to other types of killings is problematic in many 
ways. The imposition of terms such as barbaric, horrific, repugnant, and backward upon those 
who engage in suicide bombings is also violent in its infliction of a temporal past upon the 
contemporaneous realities of many people.  
           In thinking about other ways of imagining various relationships with death, grief, and 
loss, as well as motivations for different types of violence, it is imperative to not only complicate 
the dominant narratives that are being deployed by the modern, western hegemony, but also to 
resist generalizations or efforts to understand the realities of others. In this section, I have traced 
through a genealogy of horror through drone strikes and suicide bombings. Through the 
impossibility of a true knowledge of the intentions or feelings of the people who live at the other 
















A furnace for tyrants 
Above us, drones? 
 
The friendly drones, the enemy 
Which makes death fall 
Overhead 
As though we are fields 
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Part IV: Resistance Through Other Voices 
           In thinking about drone violence, it is necessary not only to think about suffering, but also 
about the presence of power. However obvious it may seem, the need to address geopolitical 
power dynamics is clear. Although there is a great amount of research done regarding Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) amongst those who operate drone strikes, I will center this 
section around those whose trauma is not researched, studied, or documented in the same way. I 
wish not to invalidate the trauma of the drone operators, as their suffering is completely 
legitimate, but rather to center the voices of those at the other end of this violence and to validate 
their trauma as well. It is a particularity of the United States, and more generally the modern 
West, to be concerned with its own citizens, troops, and people, however they choose to define 
them. This leads to a prioritization and hierarchy of forms of life in which the public in the 
modern West is invested. The emergence of drone strikes arrives from the need for the lives of 
American troops to be detached and removed from violence.  
           This prioritization and arrangement of certain lives over others contributes to the function 
of terminologies of oppression, such as ‘terrorism,’ ‘targets,’ and ‘collateral damage.’ This 
language, which I have previously described, stems from the unequal and economistic valuing of 
‘our’ lives over ‘theirs’ without recognizing context, circumstance, or human experience. In this 
way, it has become acceptable to outwardly care and show concern for our troops and their 
trauma, while negating that of those living at the other end of the violence. As this form of 
thinking has become obvious, so has the research into the ways in which U.S. soldiers and drone 
strike operators come back from killing others and are not the same. This is given the diagnosis 
of PTSD, as if there is something psychologically unnatural about their inability to kill other 
humans and remain unchanged. Has the trauma of those living under the threat of this violence 
ever been studied or diagnosed? It is for these reasons that I will not be centering this section 
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around the PTSD of the U.S. drone operators, as this type of trauma has already gained a great 
deal of academic and psychological attention.  
 
Examining Other Types of Expression and Knowledge: 
              Instead, I am interested in questioning and rethinking dominant forms of caring 
(designated only for those who commit the killings) by looking into the resistance from those at 
the other end of drone violence. It is important to allow for these voices to emerge, as it is their 
trauma that should be addressed. The ways in which drone violence affects the everyday lives of 
so many people who live under this threat are not often acknowledged in dominant accounts or 
reports related to drone strikes. It is necessary to also think about how these voices appear within 
mainstream American media. For example, if interviews are being used, it is imperative to 
address the complicated ways in which certain dynamics might manipulate the responses and 
testimonies. It is important to be aware of the problematic power structures that might manifest 
themselves through leading interview questions or fears of identification from those who are 
interviewed. Due to these complicated forces, it is also necessary to bring in voices through 
forms other than testimonies and interviews. 
           In addition to addressing voices of those who are usually relegated to the peripheries 
through interviews, while acknowledging the problematics of this type of encounter, this section 
will also draw upon other forms of expression that reflect the voices of those living under the 
threat of drone violence. These forms will include art, rug making, music, poetry, and graffiti 
that those at the other end of the violence create. In looking at these types of knowledge or 
expression, the data-centered, empirical, economistic way of thinking about humans-as-numbers 
will be disrupted. Instead, this alternative type of ‘evidence,’ an expression of the human that 
may not be viewed as completely ‘rational,’ is incredibly meaningful for an ethical and 
thoughtful approach to studying the emergence of resistance through various voices. 
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           Although the form of interviews has its shortcomings, it is a useful way of accessing 
various perspectives and insights from those whose voices are not usually recognized or valued 
within the international geopolitical sphere. It might be helpful to think about a specific event, as 
it may represent various elements that are particular to the nature of drone strike violence. On 
March 17, 2011, a U.S. drone strike was deployed on the town of Datta Khel in North Waziristan 
(a region of Pakistan). Although the United States claimed that those who were killed in this 
strike were “insurgents”37 who were planning an attack, numerous witnesses, survivors, and 
family members contradicted this. In several accounts, the U.S. drone strike targeted a jirga, a 
community meeting where people help settle disputes in the town, which killed forty two people. 
In examining these accounts, it is clear the ways in which drone strikes have affected the 
everyday lives of victims and family members of drone strike victims.  
           The drone strike, which targeted the jirga on March 17, 2011, was classified as a 
‘signature strike,’ which specifically targets ‘suspicious behavior.’ Although the people who 
were attending the jirga told Pakistani authorities about this meeting at least ten days prior, they 
were still attacked. However, it is useful here to question the implications of signature strikes. 
People who are living under the threat of this type of violence avoid being targeted in this way 
by having a consistent schedule and predictability. Any ‘unusual’ or ‘abnormal’ behavior is 
deemed ‘suspicious.’ Thus, signature strikes not only create fear amongst ordinary people, but 
they also inflict and impose a certain western, modern sense of time, in a way punishing those 
who do not conform to western notions of efficiency, punctuality, regularity, and precision. 
These signature strikes impose not only physical violences, but also the additional colonial 
violence of a destruction of different relationships with time.  
           In many reports of the drone attack, the jirga was convened in order to settle disputes in 
the town regarding the ownership of chromite deposits in the region. While a Pakistani military 
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chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani condemned the attack, stating “it is highly regrettable 
that a jirga of peaceful citizens, including elders of the area, was carelessly and callously targeted 
with complete disregard to human life,” American officials denied the innocence of the victims 
of this attack. “‘These people weren’t gathering for a bake sale,’ an American official said. ‘They 
were terrorists.’”38 Although the target of this airstrike was clearly a jirga, a peaceful meeting to 
settle conflicts, American officials still justified the violence by invoking reductionist language 
that diminishes humans to figures whose lives can be targeted and destroyed.  
 
Following Forms of Violence: Here and There; Now and Later: 
           When news reports and media documentation of these violent events occur, the victims 
are never named or discussed. Their faces never appear on the screen or in the newspaper. In this 
way, the violence of drone strikes, as well as the threat that it poses, is rendered invisible in the 
news media. However, in addition to this erasure, the concept of a singular ‘atrocity event’ 
should be complicated. The actual event of a drone strike is incredibly traumatizing, violent, and 
destructive in many ways. However, there are additional violences that are present as well. In 
accordance with the temporality of a past, present, and future, it is worth looking into the ways in 
which the presence of drone strikes has permeated all three of these temporal categories.  
           In the beforehand of drone strikes, the threat of this type of violence is ever-present. The 
overwhelming and omniscient presence, although not necessarily seen, is felt in many people’s 
lives. Not only do children fear playing outside when the sky is blue, but the humming presence 
has become a source of overpowering anxiety, worry, fear, terror, and fright amongst ordinary 
people, who happen to find themselves at the other end of this threat. Where are the extensive 
studies about their trauma? Why is this form of violence somehow viewed as less important than 
the PTSD of U.S. drone operators? “I prefer cloudy days when the drones don’t fly. When the 
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sky brightens and becomes blue, the drones return and so does the fear. Children don’t play so 
often now, and have stopped going to school. Education isn’t possible as long as the drones 
circle overhead” (McVeigh).39  Not only does the threat of drone strikes affect education and 
children’s play, but also has permeated the everyday lives of ordinary people, producing anxiety 
and worry for their lives and their loved ones. The notion that drone strikes are singular, isolated 
events must be complicated. The violence that is deployed through these attacks is more ever 
reaching, insidious, and pervasive than the dominant narrative lets on.  
           Not only does this violence occur during and before the event, but it also exists in the 
aftermath of the attack. How to deal with loss and grief is perhaps one of the most meaningful 
elements of what it means to be human. The ways in which people deal with this loss is a 
particularly significant part of their lives. When dealing with the deaths and destruction that the 
drone attacks have imposed, it is necessary to think about the ways in which the families and 
loved ones of drone strike victims have navigated this painful terrain. As described in the NYU 
and Stanford report, entitled “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From 
US Drone Practices in Pakistan,”40 the difficulties and pain that come from trying to deal with 
the destruction left from the airstrikes is emotionally and physically exhausting.  
“Unable to identify the body parts lying on the ground, all Khalil Khan could do was 
‘collect pieces of flesh and put them in a coffin.’ Idris Farid, who survived the strike 
with a severe leg injury, explained how funerals for the victims of the March 17 strike 
were ‘odd and different than before.’ The community had to collect [the victims’] body 
pieces and bones and then bury them like that,’ doing their best to ‘identify the pieces 
and the body parts’ so that the relatives at the funeral would be satisfied they had ‘the 
right parts of the body and the right person.’ The trauma of the strike was felt not only 
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by those who witnessed its immediate aftermath, but also by the families left behind” 
(60)41.  
         This destruction and despair left behind by drone attacks have made it so that people are 
unable to recognize the bodies of their loved ones, which have become mangled, distorted, and 
unidentifiable because all that is left of them are pieces. This fragmentation of bodies recalls a 
certain inability to see people who live at the other end of these attacks as full humans, even 
when they are alive. Terminologies such as ‘terrorist,’ ‘target,’ ‘collateral damage,’ and ‘side 
effect,’ as I have discussed in Part II, evoke a certain negation of the status of full humanness. As 
the description of the inability to deal with loss, grief, and trauma due to the annihilation of 
bodies illustrates, the way of dealing with this pain has been disavowed even further. This 
deprivation of such an integral part of human experience (dealing with loss) is perhaps one of the 
most violent forms of power that the drone strike deploys. This additional violence demonstrates 
the necessity to challenge the idea that a drone strike is a singular, isolated event. Not only does 
it permeate the ways of being in the world for those whose lives are threatened by the humming 
presence of drone strikes, but it also invades into the aftermath of the attack. The destruction of 
these bodies from afar involves a specific type of insidious violence, which then neglects to 
acknowledge the ruin it has created. The recognition that the violence exists in the beforehand, 
the attack, and its aftermath is useful in the complication of a simple conception of a singular 
atrocity event. The trauma from drone strike victims and their families and loved ones can live 
on and haunt them for lifetimes.  
 
Engaging with Other Forms of Resistance: 
           In order to complicate other dominant ways of thinking about drone strikes and the 
victims they produce, it is important to bring in other types of ‘documentation’ or evidential 




will step away from forms of documentation that have become heavily relied upon, such as 
interviews, reports, and statistical data. In order to contest these modes of thinking and of 
knowing, it is necessary to engage with other forms of expression. These ways of relating with 
the world include art, poetry, music, narratives, and rugs. These seemingly marginal modes of 
expressing feelings, emotions, traumas, fears, and loves are incredibly important in thinking 
about violence in the world and about thoughtful ways of relating with others. In thinking about 
these forms of art, it is also necessary to keep in mind the understanding that (in my case, 
personally) I cannot truly know the pain, trauma, and suffering that the writers, singers, artists, 
carpet-makers, and speakers have endured, and continue to endure. However, with these types of 
expressions and voices, another pathway of relating to other people and experiences is opened. 
These forms represent various other entry points into different ways of thinking about the world.  
           Nazia Iqbal, a Pashto singer from Pakistan highlights the feelings of helplessness in her 
poems: "My love, you are far away from me, and these drones will target you. I am helpless and 
can't stop them, and my tears are dropping from my eyes as if water is dropping from a spring."42 
This poem illustrates the feelings of complete powerlessness in the face of the overwhelming 
immensity and capacity of drones. Not only does the poem recall the pain and heartbreak of the 
condition of love, with all of its vulnerabilities, but it also evokes the helplessness attributed to 
the feeling of living under the threat of drone strikes and fearing for the lives of those who live 
under this threat. 
           The heartbreakingly beautiful poem by Nazia Iqbal evokes the idea of helplessness and 
vulnerability. In Adriana Cavarero’s Horrorism43, she describes the differences between these 
two concepts. Vulnerability is the condition of being able to be wounded at any time. This is an 
unchanging condition, where there is always potential for someone to be exposed to a vulnus. 
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However, the concept of helplessness is different. Only under certain circumstances can a 
person be helpless.  
“As its etymology suggests, the ‘helpless one’ (‘l’inerme,’ literally ‘the unarmed one’) 
is he who does not bear arms and thus cannot harm, kill, or wound. But in everyday 
usage, rather than this incapacity to take the offensive, the term ‘helpless’ tends to 
designate a person who, attacked by an armed other, has no arms with which to defend 
himself. Defenseless and in the power of the other, the helpless person finds himself 
substantially in a condition of passivity, undergoing violence he can neither flee from 
nor defend against. The scene is entirely tilted toward unilateral violence. There is no 
symmetry, no parity, no reciprocity” (Cavarero 30).  
          In this way, Cavarero points to the concept of helplessness and the circumstances under 
which a person may be categorized as such. In this love poem, the feeling of helplessness is 
clear. It is a poignant and disarming form of expressing a pain that seems overwhelmingly 
impossible to counter. However, it is interesting to look into the various ways in which people 
engage with this pain by resisting through artistic and poetic forms. The realm of art, music, and 
poetry is perhaps the most powerful form of resisting due to its emotive and political qualities. 
One interesting form that has been used by certain people who chose to exhibit the realities and 
pervasion of drone violence is through rugs.  
 
           Drones have begun to appear on rugs in certain places in Pakistan. These ‘war rugs,’ as 
they are referred do, have previously featured AK-47s and tanks in the 1980s, but now are 
reflecting the presence of drones. “One of the older local weavers, now in her 80s, told me that 
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the reason for weaving drones on carpets by women here is to show to the West that their 
brutal killing machines are always under our feet.”44 The anger and frustration toward drone 
strikes and their unwelcome existence in the everyday lives of so many people, especially for 
these women who were displaced from Afghanistan after the Soviet war and now live in refugee 
camps in Pakistan, is expressed in these rugs. The market for these rugs is mostly in the West, so 
the expression of frustration is particularly pointed and poignant. Having been rendered voiceless 
against drones in other ways, these war rugs allow for their voices to be heard through this 
economic exchange. Perhaps these manifestations of images of drones on war rugs will force 
those who do not think about this violence on a daily basis to realize that the threat of drone 
violence has become omnipotent and pervasive for those who make the carpets under which they 
stand. 
 
           Street art and poetry have also become significant forms of resistance in Yemen.45 Street 
art, or graffiti, specifically, has become an important part of the public opposition to drone 
strikes, allowing for this type of art to be accessible to anyone who walks by it, rather than just 
on the white walls of contemporary art galleries. In this way, the distance between the graffiti 
and the viewer is diminished, allowing for more engagement with this art. One of Murad Subay’s 
public art campaigns in 2013 in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen, was called “12 Hours,” which 
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discussed twelve social and political issues in Yemen. One of these issues was U.S. drones. 
For this issue, a spray painting depicted a seven-foot long U.S. drone, under which an image of a 
child appears with: ‘Why did you kill my family?’ written in red letters in both English and 
Arabic. This usage of street art as a new form of communicating with people in the community is 
another way in which the frustration, pain, suffering, and heartbreak is demonstrated. “[Art] 
galleries in Yemen belong to one class. Graffiti is for all people.”46 Subay mentions this 
influence of street art as something that does not just belong to a certain group of people, but is 
for all of the community. The threat of drone attacks there does not just target one group, but it is 
present for the entire community.  
           Poetry has also become an important part of resistance against drones in Yemen, as an 
anti-drone poetry contest has become another artistic medium through which to express anger. 
The poems were submitted by more than thirty people, with lines such as, “From above, death 
descends upon us,” “Drones are the friend of our enemy,” “Do you fight terrorism with 
terrorism?”, and more.47 Although the uncertainty and anxiety surrounding the threat of drone 
strikes has become ever-present and overwhelming, poetry, art, graffiti, and other creative forms 
of artistic and poetic expression offer another imagination of how to express voices in a 













           After having outlined a few of the ethical, philosophical, and political aspects of drone 
strikes and their violences, it is necessary to think about what questions remain as well as what 
entry points into other ways of thinking are possible. When thinking about drone violence, it is 
useful to think about the hyper-technologized and mechanized nature of the killings as a facet of 
the atrocity, but not the entirety of the violence. Perhaps it may be helpful to think of the type of 
violence that drones deploy as facilitating the violence, but not truly causing it. The war machine 
that the U.S. continues to perpetuate is one of the main, driving factors of this type of violence. 
What, then, are the remaining questions, puzzlings, implications, or concerns that stem from 
drone killings? How might it be possible for these issues to be addressed within the language of 
the modern West and its political realm? Or would it be more beneficial to use an alternative 
language or form of thinking about this type of violence in the international arena in order to 
include more voices and more perspectives (especially from those at the other end of drone 
violence)? How might these lingering questions assist us in pursuit of a more thoughtful, ethical, 
and inclusive way of thinking and writing about violence in the international sphere? Here, I will 
outline some of these remaining questions that persist throughout the four parts of this paper. 
 
           Perhaps it is time to revisit the shocking image of Omran Daqneesh, a figure who became 
symbolic of the suffering of an entire group of people. It is useful to question and rethink the 
conditions through which Omran enters into the Western political imaginary. Earlier in this 
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thesis, I have problematized the ways in which this specific image, rather than other images, 
has gained such large amounts of media attention. However, there remains another aspect of this 
image and the political mechanisms that operate around it, which is worth considering. About a 
month after Omran’s picture was released, another young boy gained international media 
attention as well. Alex, a six-year-old boy from Scarsdale, New York also gained attention after 
his family posted a video of him reading a letter he wrote, addressed to former President Obama. 
In this letter, Alex asked if Omran could come to the U.S. and live with him and his family. 
“Since he won’t bring toys, I will share my bike and I will teach him how to ride it. I will teach 
him addition and subtraction. My little sister will be collecting butterflies and fireflies for him... 
We can all play together. We will give him a family and he will be our brother.”48 The heartfelt, 
sincere, genuine, and touching words of this young boy were so powerful that former President 
Obama referred to them in his speech to the United Nations in his remarks at the Leaders 
Summit on Refugees. “The humanity that a young child can display, who hasn’t learned to be 
cynical, or suspicious, or fearful of other people because of where they’re from, or how they 
look, or how they pray, and who just understands the notion of treating somebody that is like him 
with compassion, with kindness – we can all learn from Alex.” 49 I understand and appreciate 
Alex’s kind words and the compassion, empathy, and kind-heartedness that he displays through 
his letter. I also acknowledge the thoughtful message that former President Obama was sending 
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            However, with these words, the humanity that is being invoked is imparted mostly 
upon Alex. What would it mean to allow this same humanity to be conveyed upon Omran as 
well, rather than viewing him as a victim or object? Is there a way to think about Omran without 
perpetuating the savior complex that is so engrained and embedded in the modern West’s 
humanitarian project? Could there be a way to give the same humanity to Omran that has been 
awarded to Alex? In other words, is there a way of seeing Omran as a full human, just as Alex is 
viewed as such? As I discussed in the first part of this thesis, I wonder if there is a possibility of 
extending this concern to those who may not usually be depicted in these shocking images that 
enter into the modern, western political imaginary. Would a politics of empathy truly be the best 
way to engage in an ethical relationship with the international and its violences? What might this 
mean in the search for a more thoughtful engagement with violence in the world?  
           In thinking about the questions that stay with me from the second part of this thesis, it is 
worth wondering what possibilities an alternative language would present in a departure from a 
certain detached, abstracted, and sterile linguistic form that has been used by defenders of drone 
violence. What would this alternative language look like? What would it mean to involve human 
terms and intimate language when speaking about this violence? Perhaps on a more practical 
level, would this make a difference in the international response and the potential anger, outrage, 
or compassion that is created by those who receive the news of this violence? Would the moment 
of heartbreak that has been collectively felt after witnessing Omran’s photo become normalized 
and desensitized? Or would these human stories and narratives of suffering lead to a greater 
political engagement and politics of care and compassion? Is it possible to engage in a linguistic 
world that would stray from the language that deploys an economistic reduction of humans into 
numbers? In my second part of this paper, I have also traced through the various ways in which 
legal language has become conflated with moral and ethical objections and condemnations, 
which raise several complicated philosophical questions. In this section, I have attempted to 
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follow the lexical web that surrounds drone discourse, while rethinking certain deployments 
of language as well as offering potential alternatives to this impersonal, detached, and abstract 
form of speaking and thinking about drone violence.  
           In the third part of this thesis, I have attempted to complicate the first world imaginary by 
comparing the killings of drone strikes with the violence of suicide bombings. Although these 
violences are very different in their nature, motivations, and deployment, they also are quite 
similar as well. Both of these types of violence enter into the spaces of everyday life for many 
people, who live in fear and under the threat of this potential killing. Both of these forms of 
killing operate from a point of supposed invisibility, one deployed from the sky and the other 
from the body. However, the moral grounds upon which these kinds of killing are posited are 
different. It is interesting to wonder why it has become obvious that drone violence is morally 
superior to that of suicide bombings. Both of these forms of killing result in human deaths and 
destruction of lives, yet one type is viewed as a better, more sanitized, precise, efficient, and 
effective way of killing. In this rethinking of an unequal moral supposition and location, a larger, 
more insidiously pervasive web of the modern, western way of thinking is disturbed. The 
question that remains from an exploration of this web stems from the infliction of a temporal 
otherness upon the subaltern. Through the imposition of ‘our’ past upon the ‘other’s’ temporal 
present, how did one way of killing become so much more accepted and morally superior to the 
killings of the Other? Why is violence in the international sphere only recognized as horrific, 
barbaric, and repugnant in some forms, but as sterile, clean, detached, and precise in other ways? 
In other words, why are some types of violence viewed as politically valid, and others are acts of 
terror?  
           Through the progression of this paper, arriving at the fourth part has become a sort of 
culmination of the modes of thinking and of studying drone violence that I believe should be 
centered. By invoking the stories, music, art, poetry, and rug-makings that have been created by 
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those at the other end of drone violence, I have centered these voices, which have been usually 
relegated to the peripheries (or have been viewed as collateral). After recognizing that the 
method of interviewing is problematic in many ways, I also acknowledge that this form of 
gathering stories and testimonies is also useful in understanding how drone violence has 
permeated the lives of so many people. By looking at a drone strike targeted at a community 
meeting in North Waziristan, Pakistan, I invoke the trauma and hopelessness that have become 
normalized and expected on an everyday basis. Here, I have also complicated the notion of a 
singular atrocity, as the threat and the aftermath are extremely violent as well. After exploring 
the voices that emerge through forms such as poetry, art, music, graffiti, and rugs, I have 
challenged the data-centered and economistic way of treating humans, and have tried to focus on 
other modes of human expression, which contribute to the treatment of those who live at the 
other end of drone violence as full humans.  
           Although there are many facets of drone strikes and their violences that can be studied and 
explored, the four parts of my thesis represent the aspects of drone violence that I found most 
important. Although there are still many remaining questions, problems, concerns, and 
implications that linger after having reconsidered various features of drone violence, this paper 
reflects the significance of engaging in meaningful ways of thinking about violence in our 
world(s). Upon reflection, I realize that this paper may not offer concrete solutions or alternatives 
to the current web of violent systems in place. However, it does attempt to raise important 
questions and perhaps to offer different ways of thinking about this type of violence. With this 
thesis, it is my intention to move toward a more ethical and thoughtful mode of thinking and 
relating with others and with the world, through a questioning, challenging, complicating, and 
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